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I
t might be a risky enterprise to publish a historical 
monograph written some eighty years ago, which at 
the time addressed the very recent developments of 
1918-1923—this would seem to be much more suited to 
lively memoirs than a cool-blooded analysis and archival 
research. Indeed, since 1934 when Vasyl Kuchabsky's 
Die Westukraine im Kampfe mit Polen und dem 
Bolschewismus in den Jahren 1918-1923 was published 
in Germany in a small seminar series, a great number of 
books and articles on the relevant topics have appeared, 
and even a greater number of archival documents, letters 
and memoirs have become accessible to scholars.
Still, as Frank Sysyn rightly points out in his short 
foreword to the English translation of Kuchabsky's book, 
“it remains critical to the study of the topics [outlined in 
its title]. It is also essential to understanding the views of 
a leading Western Ukrainian political activist and thinker, 
himself a participant in that struggle, and, through him, 
the generation that shaped Ukrainian politics in the first 
half of the twentieth century” (ix).
Oleksandr Pavlyuk, who penned an informative 
introduction to the book that provides readers with a sketch 
of the author's life and writing and places everything in a 
comprehensive historical and social context, emphasizes 
the importance of Kuchabsky's eyewitness accounts. Yet, 
of even greater value, he argues, is the high professional 
quality of the monograph—“a study by a scholar with a 
good education, a sharp analytical mind, and fluency in 
several European languages” (xiv).
Kuchabsky's account of the events is certainly not 
impartial. World War I found him a nineteen-year-old 
student at Lviv University; he joined as a volunteer in the 
Ukrainian Sich Riflemen—the first Ukrainian military 
legion created within the Austrian army. The experience 
of the war, of Russian captivity and escape, of the 
revolution and further fighting for Ukraine's liberation 
as the head of the Riflemen, a short stint in diplomatic 
service for the West Ukrainian National Republic, and the 
bitter fate of political emigration undoubtedly influenced 
the way in which he perceived and interpreted events.
His sympathy for the Riflemen as superior fighters 
is unreserved, his mistrust of the duplicitous Poles is 
unbalanced, his disdain for the leaders of the Ukrainian 
revolution sometimes appears extreme, and his 
repeated accusations of betrayal at the hands of Western 
governments, however warranted, sound obsessed.
Nevertheless, the book provides a comprehensive 
account of the political, military and diplomatic efforts
of Western Ukrainians to establish their independent 
republic on the ruins of the Habsburg empire—in full 
line with the prevailing Wilsonian principle of national 
self-determination, the right presumably granted by the 
victorious Entente to all East European nations. Western 
Ukraine is in the center of both the title and the narrative, 
and this makes both the book and its translation rather 
important, since there are still very few “Ukrainocentric” 
accounts of these events, which though not necessarily 
opposing the dominant Polish and Russian perspectives, 
at least provide some check on the myths and biases 
and challenge or supplement the dominant views with 
neglected facts and alternative interpretations.
Ukrainians lost their battle for independence and, 
as Kuchabsky bitterly remarks, proved to be the only 
East European nation which failed to benefit from the 
“Wilsonian” right to self-determination or, rather, which 
under strong Polish pressure was denied this right by 
the Entente and its Supreme Council. Resentment reigns 
supreme in the book, and the author is not sparing with 
his indignation of Western ignorance, hypocrisy and 
cynicism, as well as Polish arrogance, pathological 
chauvinism and perfidy. Yet, despite some excessive 
emotionality, he avoids propagandistic demonization 
and the essentialization of opponents. He aptly notes 
important nuances and internal differences within both 
the Polish and Entente camps that could have been 
effectively used by Ukrainians to their advantage.
Within the Polish camp, he distinguishes the “fanatical 
nationalism” and profound Ukrainophobia of Dmowski's 
National Democrats, on the one hand, and the more 
pragmatic approach of Pilsudski and the Polish socialists 
who flirted briefly with the idea of a Polish-Lithuanian 
or even Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian federation, on the 
other hand. Moreover, he recognizes that in late 1918 
and early 1919 the newborn Polish state was in a much 
worse internal and external situation than the Western 
Ukrainian National Republic. Internally, as a result of 
divisions caused by the Partitions, it was completely 
disorganized and chaotically ruled by different governing 
bodies. Externally, it faced actual or potential border 
disputes with all its neighbors. This was a short window 
of opportunity for WUNR, when independence could 
have been secured by military means—if Ukrainians 
had better prepared their takeover of Lviv and Eastern 
Galicia or, at least, blocked effectively their border with 
Poland, primarily the bridge across the San river at 
Peremyshl and the railway to Lviv, rather than waging
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a protracted and unsuccessful battle with Poles for Lviv, 
which ultimately was a battle of high symbolic but little 
strategic importance.
After the opportunity was lost and the Polish state 
had gradually consolidated under Pilsudski's leadership, 
the fate of Western Ukrainian independence depended 
primarily on the political and diplomatic skills of its 
leaders. And here, again, despite all his disgust for the 
“Western traitors” who sacrificed WUNR to the Poles for 
particular gains (oil fields for the Brits, an anti-German 
alliance for French), Vasyl Kuchabsky recognizes that 
the Westerners who negotiated a political settlement for 
Galicia were neither a homogeneous group nor were 
they immutable. Here the interplay of various views 
and interests was even more complicated than within 
the Polish camp. And this, again, provided Ukrainians 
with some window of opportunity—despite the huge 
advantages the Poles gained from their historical 
visibility versus the virtual absence of Ukrainians on the 
Westerners' mental maps. The Poles, indeed, had a much 
stronger and larger intellectual elite, much better contacts 
in Western capitals and, of course, they represented 
their cause more effectively by depicting Ukrainians 
as an Austrian invention and German intrigue, as wild 
Bolsheviks and/or unruly, uncultured aborigines unable 
to govern themselves and requiring assiduous Polish 
guardianship. Yet, as Kuchabsky argues, there were a 
number of opportunities to strike a deal with the Poles 
and the Entente and secure the independence of Western 
Ukraine—without Lviv and probably without the 
Boryslav-Drohobych oil fields but with due international 
recognition that was far more important for the “nowhere 
nation” than anything else.
It might have been a difficult choice—it ran counter 
to the popular mood and the inevitable mass protests. 
But “given Ukraine's internal and external situation at 
the time, it was in no position to achieve more. It was 
a major step forward for a stateless people to be able 
to set up a rump state if the choice was between this 
and complete subjection. In order to accept [this] kind 
of peace, a nation would have to be free of all ethnic 
conceptions in the realm of politics. International politics 
would have to be seen as the interplay of real national 
forces, not as a conflict involving just abstract national 
rights” (206).
In fact, Kuchabsky blames the Entente powers not 
so much for the cynicism, since Realpolitik, in his view, 
is a norm on the international scene: all the players 
are driven primarily by their particular interests, not 
universal values. He blames the Entente primarily for 
hypocrisy--the false proclamation of the Wilsonian 
principle that had not been honestly implemented, but 
which instead confused and misled Western Ukrainians, 
evoked expectations that were too high; moreover, a 
naive trust in the Entente and the sacred right of national 
self-determination distracted them from more decisive 
activity in the battlefield and more rational and pragmatic 
political decisions. To his credit, he blames not so much 
the Westerners as his countrymen, especially from
Eastern Ukraine, who discredited and undermined their 
cause rather than promoted it. At several points, he 
recognizes that the leaders of the Ukrainian revolution 
were mediocre persons, inferior in many regards to their 
Polish counterparts and unable to negotiate effectively 
with the Entente. None of them “had a comprehensive 
view of what was happening”; “isolated events were not 
seen as a part of a general context” (42).
Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych, the head of the West 
Ukrainian state and a former member of the Vienna 
parliament, is described as a “provincial lawyer,” a person 
of “strong moral principles” and “inner discipline,” 
whose “complete honesty and respectability” made him 
a “model notary and keeper of the seal”; but still he was 
not a statesman. All these features, Kuchabsky argues, 
were of little help since they only “restricted his political 
intellect, which operated only in the narrow realm of 
a puritanical simplicity” (255). The entire Western 
Ukrainian leadership is viewed in a similar way:
In the atmosphere of legality and security 
in which the Ukrainian parliamentarians in 
Austria had carried on their conflict with the 
Poles, they had never really learned that war 
is an instrument - in fact, the most refined 
instrument - of politics, and now that the 
Poles were no longer a negotiating partner 
equally subject to the verdict of Vienna, but 
an independent warring power, they were at 
a loss as to what to do in such an unusual 
situation. In the leading Ukrainian political 
circles there was not a single relatively 
prominent personality who was capable, in 
this difficult situation, of taking the reins in 
his own hands and directing events. (41)
East Ukrainian leaders evoke in him even greater 
disdain. Volodomyr Vynnychenko is mentioned briefly 
as a “baleful man of letters” whose politics “had done a 
good deal of damage to Eastern Ukraine in 1917-18, just 
as in the decade before 1917 his clever pen had poisoned 
the intellectual atmosphere” (158-59). General Mykhailo 
Omelianovych-Pavlenko is described as a “serviceman 
through and through, very modest in ideas and general 
cultural interests,” skilful in “training troops” but not 
in “leading them in warfare.” “He was unable to grasp 
a broader totality, be it political or strategic, consider 
it from different viewpoints, and chart a way forward” 
(186). Even Symon Petliura, “a brilliant orator with a 
winning personality, witty, modest and gentle,” a great 
patriot of Ukraine (“no one had greater love for the 
fatherland than he”), whose name “became practically 
synonymous with the whole enterprise of the Ukrainian 
People's Republic,” was, in Kuchabsky's view, merely a 
“tribune of the people, not a statesman” (92-93):
He had no understanding of what constituted 
the underlying strength of a state or of 
what moral and intellectual preparation
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was necessary for a position in the service 
of that state. He considered a national 
sentiment an adequate basis on which to 
found a state. He sought without scruple 
to arouse national enthusiasm among the 
people and was prepared to use any means 
to that end, whether socialist demagogy to 
whip up the masses or an appeal to defend
civil order in Ukraine against the threat of
Bolshevism... [National independence] 
became for him a fanatical religion for which 
he would live and die. But this was only a 
fanatical emotion, without insight, without 
understanding. He distrusted the senior 
officers of the former Russian army, looking 
instead for the kind of carelessness that, in 
his mind, went with a proper warlike spirit.
He failed to recognize that the army is better 
fitted to the task of building a modern nation-
state if it is strongly disciplined in its military 
behavior and in its dealings with the civilian 
population and has a strong sense of honor.
(93)
In sum, “Petliura was not a man of any great political 
talent, and he never really understood the need for proper 
organization of the army and the country” (286).
These assessments, however harsh and at times 
imbalanced, deserve our attention since Vasyl Kuchabsky 
had firsthand knowledge of many Western and Eastern 
Ukrainian leaders. The Westerners, in his view, deserved 
less censure, since under peaceful conditions they 
were well qualified to manage the country lawfully 
and efficiently. Their problem was rather external. As 
“small-minded pacifist philistines” (190), with poor 
statesmanship qualities and strategic vision, they could 
not withstand effectively the Polish invasion and Entente 
betrayal. The Easterners, in Kuchabsky's view, were 
crude products of the “radical democratic, revolutionary 
socialist and internationalist development” (93)—not 
gentrified by liberal notions of constitutionalism, rule 
of law, separation of powers, and institutional efficacy. 
Hence, their problem was first and foremost internal. 
They proved to be absolutely dysfunctional in governing 
and state-building. “Such a task greatly exceeded 
intellectual, political and material strength of the Eastern 
Ukrainian national movement. The national leadership 
would perhaps have measured up to the task of building 
an independent state in a country the size of Lithuania. 
But Eastern Ukraine. had a population of thirty million” 
(71).
The bitter truth, according to Kuchabsky, is that 
the Ukrainian People's Republic “was no more a state 
than any of the other counterrevolutionary enterprises 
in Eastern Europe in 1919, such as those of Aleksandr 
Kolchak or Anton Denikin. It was merely a military 
organization. Just as in the case of the reactionary armies 
in Russia, the masses of the people did not take part in 
this organization. In some areas they approved of it;
in others, they rebelled against it. But that was the full 
extent of their relations to this organization” (92).
National leadership, in Kuchabsky's political 
philosophy, plays the paramount historical role--far more 
important than the common folk. Nonetheless, at certain 
points, the author comes to recognize a connection 
between the quality of elite and the population at large. 
Great statesmen and military leaders, indeed, can do 
miracles even with an immature population--as seemed 
to happen, for a brief time, with the Western Ukrainian 
army under General Aleksandr Grekov's lead. But 
one can barely build a full-fledged nation-state upon 
miracles, especially if these “miracles,” as Kuchabsky 
implies, are also products of some path-dependency: 
“[Grekov] was one of the few Russians who linked his 
fate to that of Ukraine. In his thinking and his actions 
he was a statesman of a great political nation, Russia. 
He had what the Western Ukrainians lacked - a mature 
political culture that had developed out of the manifold 
experience of the Russian Empire” (230-31).
Whatever miracles might have happened, the 
path-dependency is unavoidable in the long run. And 
Kuchabsky, despite all his profound elitism, comes to 
recognize a bitter egalitarian truth about the Ukrainian 
revolution: “The internal state of the Ukrainian nation 
itself, with its sociopolitical divisions, made it unfit for 
the task of establishing an Eastern Ukrainian state. In the 
art of politics it showed itself too weak to build any kind 
of state, whether democratic or conservative” (71).
Besides the Poles and Bolsheviks who presented the 
main challenge to Ukraine's independence and who are 
rightly featured in the title of Kuchabsky's book, there was 
one more force that contributed to Ukraine's ordeal. The 
author defines it as the “all-Russian counterrevolution” 
represented in the southwestern part of the former 
Russian Empire, including the territory of Ukraine, 
by the “White Guard” of General Anton Denikin. In 
September 1919, they threw Petliura's government out 
of Kyiv—just a few days after the Ukrainian troops 
took it over from the Bolsheviks. This left Ukrainians 
with little choice but to declare war on Denikin, even 
though they tried to avoid military confrontation with 
Russian monarchists and were ready for negotiations 
and some sort of compromise. The Russians, however, 
preferred the language of ultimatums demanding from 
Ukrainians unconditional submission to “Russia, one 
and indivisible.”
“For Denikin's army, this was madness” [292], since 
it not only severely hampered the Ukrainian struggle for 
independence but also dramatically undermined Denikin's 
own chances to defeat Bolsheviks in his rather successful 
march to Moscow. Nevertheless, as Kuchabsky aptly 
remarks, “this was a typical result of the situation created 
by the senseless divisions in the counterrevolution. 
Once again the superiority of the Bolshevik strategy over 
that of the Russian counterrevolution was demonstrated 
with a great clarity. The Bolsheviks could have easily 
advanced from the north to occupy Ukrainian-held 
territory. But they preferred to postpone the occupation
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of Ukraine until Denikin's forces had been finally 
defeated by the Ukrainians” (293). Remarkably, in 25 
years, the Bolsheviks once again demonstrated the same 
superior strategy—postponing their advance on Warsaw 
until the Nazis fully extinguished the Polish uprising.
“In overestimating its own potential, the all-Russian 
counterrevolution completely failed to realize that the 
driving force that could be turned against the Bolsheviks 
was not its own desire for restoration but the regional desire 
to separate” (283). The extreme stupidity of the Russian 
monarchists who were dogmatically attached to the idea 
of “one and indivisible Russia” and idiosyncratically 
rejected any demands of imperial nationalities for a 
broader self-rule, is a rather well-documented and 
broadly recognized fact. Vasyl Kuchabsky, however, 
goes beyond this recognition. He tries to explain the 
reasons for such a dramatic, unbelievable blindness on 
the part of an otherwise rational, well-educated imperial 
elite.
He concludes that Russia was not perceived by the 
ruling elite as a multiethnic state because, unlike most 
European countries, it had not undergone the process 
of democratization throughout the nineteenth century. 
The Russian nation, for them, was limited to the upper 
stratum. As long as this stratum (with the remarkable 
exception of Poland and Finland) was Russian or 
Russified, rather indifferent to cultural, let alone political 
particularism, all ethnic differences among the passive 
popular masses within the empire were irrelevant. 
“This numerous all-Russian upper stratum, consisting 
of a bureaucracy in constant flux, as well as of long-
established large landowners and bourgeois, gave the
empire a unified character... It cemented the bond 
between St. Petersburg and the ethnically non-Russian 
periphery and knit together the non-Russian masses, 
with their real but politically inconsequential ethnic 
differences, into a more or less organic union with the 
Russian Empire as if this empire were an ethnic unit, an 
ethnic Russian entity” (270).
So, Kuchabsky insightfully writes, “when the all-
Russian representatives of the Russian empire expressed 
their contempt for the insignificant separatist activities 
among the ethnically non-Russian peoples; or when 
they proclaimed the national unity of the Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belarusians and described the Ukrainian 
movement in Dnipro Ukraine as a fantasy; even when 
they rejected with indignation the term ‘multiethnic 
state' with reference to Russia and preferred to think of 
it as a united nation-state, then, given the overwhelming 
dominance of the ‘all-Russian' idea, they were correct 
for the time being” (270).
The Revolution of 1917 destroyed this pre-modern 
quasi-national unity but the “all-Russian” elite failed 
to recognize its meaning - exactly as they had never 
actually recognized the real meaning of the French 
Revolution and all the eventual democratizing- 
nationalizing developments in Europe, America, and 
worldwide. “Russia as an all-Russian national state, 
the state of the Russians and the Russified upper strata,
was now irretrievably lost. What emerged in 1917 
was a multiethnic state in which the democratized and 
nationally conscious non-Russian peoples regarded 
themselves as equals of the Russians. There was no 
reason why a democratic sovereign people, in ethnically 
non-Russian territories such as Ukraine, should allow 
their state to go on having this all-Russian character.” 
(271).
The process of the empire's disintegration looked 
inevitable but, all of a sudden, “the old Muscovite- 
Russian conception of imperial unity emerged again 
in a new and unexpected form: Bolshevism” (272). 
Long before 1917, Kuchabsky writes, the Bolsheviks 
understood that not only tsarism but also the idea of all-
Russian unity had irrevocably played out its historical 
role. Any social emancipation inevitably entailed an 
awakening and national emancipation of non-Russian 
nationalities. Nationalism was a force to be reckoned 
with. The Bolsheviks as egalitarians understood what 
the elitist counterrevolutionaries could not grasp. If you 
cannot contain the process, you'd better try to lead it. 
They employed, with the highest skill, their favorite 
tactics of “give away - take back” to dismantle the old 
empire and re-establish the new.
First, to mobilize allies in their struggle against 
the Provisional Government and weaken the imperial 
apparatus, they proclaimed the “right of self-
determination for the nationalities of Russia, including 
their right to separate.” Then, when the ancien regime 
collapsed with the substantial help of peripheral 
nationalists, they began reconstruction of the empire 
under the slogans “proletarian internationalism” and 
“world revolution.” To some extent, they offered the 
non-Russian nationalities a share in the global social- 
revolutionary joint-venture called the “USSR” that 
appeared ultimately to be just a cover-sheet for the same 
old-new Russian Empire.
In order to stem the centrifugal 
tendencies of [imperial] nationalities and 
weld them together once more into a unified 
political nation, the Bolsheviks advanced 
not a political but a social program. Unlike 
in the old regime, the all-Russian idea would 
now penetrate to the lower strata. While 
leaving their ethnic, regional and linguistic 
particularities untouched, as was the practice 
under tsarism, the Bolsheviks spoke to the 
political aspirations of the nationalities, 
calling on them to create the closest possible 
bond with the Russian state and, in the name 
of the international social-revolutionary 
solidarity of the non-Russian and Russian 
peoples, to defend Soviet Russia against the 
whole capitalist world. These nationalities 
would then be restricted in the process of 
their development toward nationhood and 
kept politically at the level of their “Little 
Russian” regional particularity not by power
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of the Russified upper strata but by means 
of the free will of the non-Russified lower 
strata. (274)
However brilliant the idea, the Bolsheviks largely 
overestimated the ability of social categories to substitute 
for national categories. The “free will” of the non-Russian 
masses did not prove to be a sufficient bond to hold the 
multiethnic empire together vis-a-vis the centrifugal 
tendencies of ethnic nationalisms. The new regime had 
to rely not only on the power of the Russified upper strata 
but also on the secret police and mass terror to keep the 
democratically emancipated masses at bay. It turned out 
exactly as Kuchabsky predicted: “with the decline of the 
democratic revolution, an even greater despotism than 
the tsarist one would emerge: world-revolutionary Soviet 
Russia” (274).
In 1918-23, both Western and Eastern Ukrainians lost 
their struggle for independence but the Ukrainian question 
had not disappeared from the agenda either in interwar 
Poland or in the Soviet Union, but instead continued to 
poison the organism ofboth states, ultimately contributing 
to their decline. In the early 1930s, when Kuchabsky was 
completing his book, he could certainly not predict the 
timing of pending processes or their specific ends. But 
he felt perspicaciously that all the parties “caught up in 
a wild and vicious conflict” are ultimate losers, “sliding 
toward dissolution and internal collapse” (327).
Despite all its misapprehensions and limitations, 
Vasyl Kuchabsky's insightful book remains important 
reading for any student of the history of the region as 
well as its still complicated present.
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